In this episode of Programmed to Fail, we discuss the integral role of rivalrous competition in the discovery of knowledge and the growth of technology. It finds that policy maker's dreams about single best plans and pre-coordinating service behavior to avoid duplication, competition, and overlap is a false economy, one that stamps out the true creative potential of the American people and harms national security.

Competition not only regulates incentives by prospect of punishment and reward. Just as importantly, the competitive process solves critical problems of knowledge. In fact, competition is most important under the presence of uncertainty. Planners cannot know what is optimal outside the process in which alternative courses of action are developed, brought into competition, and evaluated. Friedrich Hayek described how “In sporting events, examinations, the awarding of government contracts, or the bestowal of prizes for poems, not to mention science, it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be.” The information on which sports team performs better, or which project plan provides the most value, is only discovered in the process of competition. Otherwise, the rivalry is wasteful if one could reliably pre-determine the winner. 

Dynamic competition results in the emergence of complex patterns of economic behavior, and consequently, technological growth. It is very different from the type of competition taught in economic textbooks or practiced in defense management. In economics, we are told about “perfect” competition, a concept which relies on bizarre assumptions of complete information and product homogeneity. In defense, we are told that contracts are awarded “competitively,” even when solutions are pre-specified and the contractors who buy-in get bailed-out. 

While officials in the Department of Defense have often talked about the benefits of competition, the policies they’ve pursued continually run counter to the one real condition necessary for competitive forces to occur: free entry. Contrary to traditional wisdom, the history of defense acquisition has shown that the advertisement and open bid process does not provide assurance of free entry. When government is the only buyer, free entry requires an organization designed for pluralism.

This podcast was produced by Eric Lofgren. You can follow me on Twitter @AcqTalk and find more information at https://AcquisitionTalk.com

Programmed to Fail - 8. Competition

Prior to WWII the U.S was a distant second in science and engineering. By the time the war was over, U.S. science and engineering had blown past the British, and led the world for 85 years.

How the U.S. Became A Science Superpower

The U.S. has spent the last 70 years making massive investments in basic and applied research. Government funding of research started in World War II driven by the needs of the military for weapon systems to defeat Germany and Japan. Post WWII the responsibility for investing in research split between agencies focused on weapons development and space exploration (being completely customer-driven) and other agencies charted to fund basic and applied research in science and medicine (being driven by peer-review.)


The Endless Frontier: U.S. Science and National Industrial Policy: Part 6a The Secret History of Silicon Valley

US global dominance in science was no accident, but a product of a far-seeing partnership between public and private sectors to boost innovation and economic growth.



How the United States Gave Up Being a Science Superpower

International Policy students will be spending their careers in an AI-enabled world. We wanted our students to be prepared for it. This is why we’ve adopted and integrated AI in our Stanford national security policy class – Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition.

Here’s what we did, how the students used it, and what they (and we) learned.

Teaching National Security Policy with AI

We just finished our 10th annual Hacking for Defense class at Stanford.

What a year.

Hacking for Defense, now in 70 universities, has teams of students working to understand and help solve national security problems. At Stanford this quarter the 8 teams of 41 students collectively interviewed 1106 beneficiaries, stakeholders, requirements writers, program managers, industry partners, etc. – while simultaneously building a series of minimal viable products and developing a path to deployment.

Hacking for Defense @ Stanford 2025 – Lessons Learned Presentations

We just finished the 15th<>annual Lean LaunchPad class at Stanford. The class had gotten so popular that in 2021 we started teaching it in both the winter and spring sessions.

During the 2025 spring quarter the eight teams spoke to 935 potential customers, beneficiaries and regulators. Most students spent 15-20 hours a week on the class, about double that of a normal class.

Lean Launchpad at Stanford – 2025

I’ve been having coffee with lots of frustrated founders (my students and others) bemoaning most VCs won’t even meet with them unless they have AI in their fundraising pitch. And the AI startups they see are getting valuations that appear nonsensical. These conversations brought back a sense of Déjà vu from the Dot Com bubble (at the turn of this century), when if you didn’t have internet as part of your pitch you weren’t getting funded.

Why Investors Don’t Care About Your Business

How did you go bankrupt?”
Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”
Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises

Every disruptive technology since the fire and the wheel have forced leaders to adapt or die. This post tells the story of what happened when 4,000 companies faced a disruptive technology and why only one survived.

Blind to Disruption – The CEOs Who Missed the Future

How To Sell to the Dept of War – The 2025 PEO Directory

When Sh!t Hits the Fan – Founders in a Crisis

A podcast on the management, technology, and political-economy of weapon systems acquisition.

Programmed to Fail - 8. Competition

Acquisition Talk